I. INTRODUCTION Many changes in health care policy occur at the federal and state levels on an annual basis. Most changes reflect the four guiding health policy principles of cost, quality, access, and equity. These same four principles were important thirty years ago when Virginia and other states implemented Medicaid programs, developed certificate of public need and professional licensing programs, and formalized existing facility licensing programs. Thirty years ago, the overriding goals included concerns over rising costs and assuring access to services of adequate quality for all. 1 Today, much of the health care law agenda is driven by federal reimbursement legislation, as well as regulations and federal legislation governing relationships between health care providers. This article is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise of the federal laws applicable to health care operations and transactions. It should, however, be of assistance in identifying develop- 199 ments in the legislature, 2 the courts,' and health care agencies' of the Commonwealth over the last two years.
II. STATE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A. Professional Licensure
Each General Assembly session brings new legislation affecting professional licensure requirements and the scope of practice among individual licensing categories. The 2001 and 2002 General Assembly Sessions were no exception.
Practitioner Profiling
Of primary interest to physicians were the changes in physician profiling legislation adopted by the 2001 General Assembly in response to regulations governing physician profiles.' The profiling was based on surveys that had been collected over the preceding two years as a requirement of 1998 legislation. 6 9. See 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 85-20-290(B) (2001) (requiring the Board to make available, as part of the profile information listed at www.vahealthprovider.com, information regarding disciplinary notices and orders).
[Vol. 37 :199 sion. During 2001, the General Assembly enacted legislation that was intended to address physician concerns about Web profile access. 1° Unfortunately, the new legislation made things worse. It directed that the Board make complaints of misconduct available upon a consumer's request identifying a specific physician, thereby expanding the potential distribution of complaints prior to Board determinations of any misconduct.
1
The General Assembly removed all of the language added in 2001 in emergency legislation effective February 28, 2002.12 The General Assembly further refined the method by which disciplinary actions can be reported online. 13 Reports of pending disciplinary actions are now limited to a statement of pending disciplining proceedings. 1 4 No further information on the specifically alleged violation is provided until such allegation is investigated and a ruling is made by the Board following an informal conference or full evidentiary hearing. 15 The 2001 General Assembly also passed health practitioner profiling legislation that requires oral and maxillofacial surgeons to report information to the Board of Dentistry.
1 6 The Board of Dentistry subsequently promulgated emergency regulations governing mandatory reporting by dentists. 
Nurse Midwives and Chiropractors
Other proposed legislation, seeking to expand the in-home practice of nurse midwifery, failed to get out of the legislative committee. House Bills 889, 890, and 891 would have expanded the limited practice of nurse midwifery in Virginia by one of sev-eral avenues." 8 Specifically, House Bill 889 would have provided for automatic licensure of those midwives who obtained the certified professional midwife credential, 19 while House Bill 891 would have exempted such persons from licensure. 2° House Bill 890 would have opened the door to certain midwives seeking direct entry into practice. 21 Greater self-regulatory efforts by chiropractors were similarly unsuccessful. Efforts to set up a separate chiropractic board failed in one instance 22 and were carried over to the 2003 session in another. 23 
Pharmacy Practice
The 2002 General Assembly also amended laws governing the practice of pharmacy. Specifically, amendments to Virginia sections 54.1-3300 and -3412 allow pharmacists to expand practice locations to include clinics and allow pharmacies to maintain a combination of paper and electronic records, as long as the records are retrievable. 2 4 Other pharmacy legislation was intended to enhance consumer access to needed medications 25 and to improve patient and public safety. 2 6
B. Licensure Requirements for Health Care Facilities
Regardless of how a health care provider chooses to organize itself, it typically must comply with specific regulatory requirements based on its licensure status. Minimal changes to facility licensure laws were made in 2002.27 In 2001, the General Assembly required outpatient surgical providers to maintain and report data that had previously gone unreported. 28 Beginning in 2002, hospitals, outpatient surgical hospitals, and physicians must report data 29 on selected outpatient surgical procedures to the Virginia Patient Level Data System. 3 " Before this law was passed, health care providers were only required to submit inpatient data to the Commonwealth. Legislators hope that the additional information collected as a result of this new law will improve consumer choice and support health care provider planning, utilization, and quality improvement activities.
3 ' The Board of Health subsequently adopted emergency regulations detailing the data submission process 3 2 for specific outpatient surgi- 29. The patient level data elements to be reported for each patient receiving outpatient surgery include hospital identifier, operating physician identifier, payor identifier, employer identifier, patient identifier, patient sex, date of birth, zip code, patient relationship to the insured, employment status code, status at discharge, admission type, date and hour of admission, diagnosis upon admission, discharge status, principal and secondary diagnoses, external cause of injury, co-morbid conditions existing but not treated, procedures and procedure dates, revenue center codes, units and charges, and total charges. OG PD 13) . The additional nursing facility beds were previously issued in two nursing facility batch cycles in 1998 and 1999 but were not developed due to the financial difficulties of the applicant in each case. The Commissioner officially revoked the certificates in December 2001 for the applicants' failure to make progress towards the completion of the nursing facility beds and previous statement of inability to develop those beds, contrary to Virginia Code section 32.1-102.4 (requiring progress towards construction and licensure of projects approved through the COPN process within a three year period 
D. Medicaid Payment
The 2002 General Assembly faced many challenges in maintaining a balanced budget as required by the Virginia Constitution. 5 6 To reduce overall budget expenditures, the General Assembly required the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services to cut general fund expenditures by $162 million over the next two years. 5 7 In the meantime, the outgoing Gilmore administration took advantage of a loophole in federal statutes and regulations governing intergovernmental transfers to obtain approximately $259 million dollars in additional Medicaid reimbursement to local nursing facilities. 5 ' The loophole allowed states to generate extra matching funds by paying nursing homes and hospitals owned by local governments more than they would normally receive and then having them return the bulk of the funds to state coffers. 59 According to the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") Office of the Inspector General, twenty-eight states took advantage of the loophole in 2000, increasing federal match funds by $5.8 billion dollars. 6 " Given that there were no restrictions on how the funds were to be used, many states spent the extra funds on non-health care related projects. 6 1 After facing a series of negative articles concerning the intergovernmental transfer proposal, 62 Virginia was able to get the assistance of two localities to obtain the federal match before January 12, 2002 [Vol. 37:199
E. Privacy of Health Information
Acknowledging the many public policy reasons to protect the confidential nature of a patient's health information, legislators pass laws governing the treatment of health information each year. In 2002, the Virginia General Assembly passed three laws relating to health information. Instead of placing restrictions on the sharing of health information, all three laws enhanced the exchange of health information. 6 4
The amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-413 provided "authorized insurers" with new access to health care providers' records and papers for a reasonable charge. 6 " This Virginia Code section already required hospitals, nursing facilities, physicians, and other health care providers 6 6 to furnish copies of health records or papers to patients or their attorneys when such copies were requested in relation to anticipated or ongoing litigation. 6 7 As amended, Virginia Code section 8.01-413 requires health care providers to respond to a patient's, attorney's, or authorized insurer's written request for documents by supplying the requested copies within fifteen days of the request." Even though this new law allows a greater number of people to access a patient's health information, the law continues to protect the patient's confidentiality by requiring providers to obtain a signed writing from the patient confirming the attorney's or insurer's authority to make the request. The amendments to Virginia Code section 37.1-116 promote the sharing of a crime victim's health information between emergency medical services agencies and law enforcement officials. 7°T his Virginia Code section already required all licensed emergency medical services agencies to report prehospital patient care data using the established Emergency Medical Services Patient Care Information System. 7 ' Under the newly modified law, when a patient is a victim of a crime, emergency medical services agencies "may disclose the prehospital patient care report to lawenforcement officials" as long as the disclosure complies with applicable privacy laws. 72 Finally, Virginia Code section 32.1-127.1:04 provides for the sharing of health information between state agencies. 7 3 This establishes a secure system for sharing protected health information among the Departments of Health, Medical Assistance Services, Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services, and Social Services. 74 According to the new law, the system is established for sharing protected health information that may be necessary for the coordination of prevention and control of disease, injury, or disability and for the delivery of health care benefits when such protected information concerns individuals who (i) have contracted a reportable disease, including exposure to a toxic substance, as required by the Board of Health pursuant to § 32.1-35 or other disease or disability required to be reported by law; (ii) are the subjects of public health surveillance, public health investigations, or public health interventions or are applicants for or recipients of medical assistance services; (iii) have been or are the victims of child abuse or neglect or domestic violence; or (iv) may present a serious threat to health or safety of a person or the7 public or may be subject to a serious threat to their health or safety. [Vol. 37:199
Virginia Code section 32.1-127.1:04 also declares that
[t]he coordination of prevention and control of disease, injury, or disability and the delivery of health care benefits are... (i) necessary public health activities; (ii) necessary health oversight activities for the integrity of the health care system; and (iii) necessary to prevent serious harm and serious threats to the health and safety of individuals and the public.
76
This declaration qualifies the disclosure of protected health information to the secure system as a disclosure that does not require patient consent or authorization under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 77 Two of the above new laws reference HIPAA, a federal law passed in 1996 to make it easier for Americans to maintain high quality health insurance coverage while changing jobs and to simplify administrative transactions by increasing the standardized use of Electronic Data Interchange. 8 Virginia health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who engage in designated electronic billing or claims transactions 79 81. Depending on the type of disclosure, the HIPAA privacy standards require covered entities to obtain a patient's authorization before disclosing the patient's protected health information. Id. § 164.506(A)(2). The HIPAA privacy standards also require covered entities to enter into agreements with "business associates" in which the business associate agrees to abide by the HIPAA privacy standards that are applicable to the covered entity.
Id. § 164.5-502(d)(1). Finally, the HIPAA privacy standards set forth various patient rights relating to protected health information. 
F. State False Claims Act
The 2002 General Assembly enacted a civil false claims act, the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act. 83 The Virginia statute mirrors the federal False Claims Act, 4 in that both statutes are now applicable to billings by health care providers that are known to be false or fraudulent claims at the time a provider requests payment or approval. 8 5 Under both the federal and state acts, a private party may initiate the lawsuit as a qui tam plaintiff. 6 The success of the federal statute in obtaining recoveries for the federal government appear to have the same intent and scope. Under both the federal False Claims Act and the Virginia 82. Id. § 160.203. "A standard requirement, or implementation specification set forth in the HIPAA privacy standards that is contrary to a provision of state law preempts the provision of state law," unless an explicit exception applies. Id. One exception states that the HIPAA privacy standards will not preempt the state law if "[t]he provision of State law relates to privacy of health information and is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted" under the HIPAA privacy standards. Id. § 160.203. "More stringent" means that the state law is more restrictive of uses and disclosures of protected health information than the HIPAA privacy standards, or that the state law permits greater rights of access or amendment to the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable health information. A qui tam action means "an action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (7th ed. 1999). The whistleblower or qui tam provisions of the federal False Claims Act and, by analogy, the Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, allow any citizen who has knowledge of a fraud against the government to bring suit in the name of the government and, for his or her efforts, to share in the proceeds. See 31 U.S.C. § § 3729 3733 (2000) twenty-five percent of the recovery. 9 If the government chooses not to intervene, the relator's share increases from twenty-five percent to thirty-five percent. 96 Implementation of the Virginia statute and its use in fighting health care fraud in the Commonwealth will be determined over the next few years.
G. Bioterrorism
Given the national developments in health care safety and security following the September 2001 terrorist attacks and bioterrorism scares, Virginia's passage of bioterrorism legislation and participation in related federal grant requests is no surprise. The legislation required certain health care providers to report to the State Police information about a patient that may indicate disease caused by exposure to an agent or substance that can be used as a weapon. 97 New statutes require physicians and laboratory directors to make reports to the Commissioner, just as they currently do for communicable diseases. Ragsdale filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, claiming that a Labor Department regulation"' required Wolverine to grant her twelve additional weeks of leave because it had not informed her that the thirtyweek absence would count against her FMLA entitlement." 0 While "Wolverine conceded it had not given Ragsdale specific notice that part of her absence would count as FMLA leave," it argued that it had complied with the FMLA by granting her more than thirty weeks of leave."' The district court granted Wolverine's motion for summary judgment, finding that the regulation was "in conflict with the In August 1998, Miller filed suit in federal court alleging, among other things, that AT&T had violated her rights under the FMLA by denying her request for the absences due to her flu. 129 Following extensive discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Miller, holding that Miller's "particular case of the flu" fit the FMLA definition of a "serious health condition" and Miller had provided the necessary certification of her need for FMLA leave. 13° On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed two issues raised by AT&T: (1) whether or not an episode of the flu is a "serious health condition" as defined by the FMLA and implementing regulations; and (2) if the flu is considered a "serious health condition" under the applicable regulations, whether or not those regulations are contrary to congressional intent and are therefore invalid.
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In resolving the first issue presented, the Fourth Circuit held that section 825.114(c) 1 32 "simply does not automatically exclude the flu from coverage under the FMLA." 1 3 3 The court further explains that "[r]ather, the provision is best read as clarifying that some common illnesses will not ordinarily meet the regulatory criteria and thus will not be covered under the FMLA." 34 The Fourth Circuit dispensed with the second issue on appeal by noting, contrary to AT&T's argument, 3 ' "the FMLA defines 'serious health condition' broadly 'and does not include any examples of conditions that either do or do not qualify as FMLA "serious health conditions. ''' 136 Therefore, the court could not say "that the regulations adopted by the Secretary [of Labor] are so manifestly contrary to congressional intent as to be considered arbitrary. ' [Vol. 37 :199 In Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,138 the Fourth Circuit clarified an employer's right to question certification under the FMLA.' 3 9 Under the FMLA, an employer may require that a claim for medical leave, for either the employee's own or a family member's condition, be supported by a medical care provider's certification. 4° In order to comply with federal regulations, "[the] employer must give notice of a requirement for medical certification each time a certification is required."' The FMLA establishes standards for the certification. ' However, a provider representing the employer may contact the employee's health care provider for authentication and clarification of medical certification only with the employee's permission. 4 If the employer doubts the validity of the certification, it may seek a second medical opinion, at its own expense, from a health care provider of its choice.' To avoid questions of validity and impartiality, this second opinion cannot be given by a health care provider employed on a regular basis by the employer. If the first two medical opinions differ, at its own expense, the employer can require a third opinion. 4 This third opinion is final and binding.' 47 "The third health care provider [also] must be designated or approved jointly by the employer and the employee." 48 While awaiting the receipt of the second or third medical opinion, the employee is statutorily entitled to the benefits of the FMLA 49 Finally, upon request, the employer must give the employee a copy of the second or third opinion within two business days of the request. 150 138 In Rhoads, Lori Denise Rhoads ("Rhoads") was a financial analyst for Standard Federal Savings Association ("SFSA"). 151 She "suffer[ed] from asthma and related migraine headachesconditions exacerbated by exposure to cigarette smoke." 15 2 After beginning work at one of SFSA's banks, "Rhoads [immediately] began feeling the negative effects from breathing co-workers' secondhand smoke." 5 ' Although SFSA requested that their employees stop smoking on company premises "'out of professional courtesy and human kindness,"' it was still unable to fully control or eliminate smoking by its employees.' Due to this fact, Rhoads was forced to seek periodic medical treatment for various medical problems and allowed by SFSA administrators to "take lengthy absences from work."' 55 Finally, SFSA officials "arranged for her to work from home to avoid exposure to secondhand smoke. "' 56 While working at home, Rhoads was transferred to another of SFSA's operations centers. 157 Shortly after her transfer, SFSA officials discovered that Rhoads was being allowed to work from home and asked her to report to the operations center for work on September 1.158 On September 1, instead of reporting to work, Rhoads called her immediate supervisor at SFSA and informed him that she could not report to work because she was ill and her doctor had advised her not to report to work for the rest of the week.' 59 Following approximately two weeks of discussion between SFSA and Rhoads concerning when she would return to work, a senior official at SFSA threatened her with disciplinary action if she did not report to work by September 13.16° When Rhoads did not report to work on September 13, she was terminated on September 15 "for refusing to return to work for ten con- Rhoads filed suit in federal court alleging that SFSA had violated her rights under the FMLA. 1 6 2 At trial, a jury determined that SFSA had not violated any of her FMLA rights because "she did not suffer from an FMLA-qualifying 'serious health condition."' 16 3 Rhoads appealed the lower court's decision to the Fourth Circuit claiming that "she should not have been required to prove that she was afflicted with such a condition and, regardless, the FDIC waived any right to contest this issue because SFSA failed to follow the FMLA's 'second opinion' 164 procedures upon receipt of her physician's certification of her ailments." 6 ' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that an employer's failure to request a second opinion will not preclude the employer from later challenging whether the employee actually suffered from a "serious health condition," entitling the employee to FMLA leave.' 66
B. Patient Rights
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court significantly strengthened patient rights in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.' 6 7 In Ferguson, patients challenged the medical practices used at the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC"). 16 ' In 1989, MUSC, a public hospital, the Charleston police department, and the Charleston prosecutor's office formed a joint task force and developed a policy requiring MUSC maternity patients meeting certain criteria to submit to urinalysis drug testing for cocaine. 6 9 This drug testing policy was in response to "an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal 161 nder this drug testing policy, doctors and other hospital personnel selected, on a discretionary basis, predominately lowincome African-American expectant mothers who had not come in earlier for prenatal care or who underwent incomplete prenatal care for testing.' 7 ' These women were then induced to provide urine samples that were tested for cocaine under procedures that would yield admissible evidence at trial. 17 2 Originally, if a patient tested positive for cocaine, hospital officials coordinated with Charleston police to have the woman arrested at the hospital.1 73 However, in 1990, the program was modified to give women who tested positive for cocaine the opportunity to enter a drug treatment program instead of being arrested. 7 4 Plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Charleston, hospital officials, and various law enforcement officials involved in the drugtesting program. 75 Plaintiffs were ten women, most of whom were African-American, who tested positive for cocaine use while receiving prenatal care at MUSC. 17 6 They asserted claims for injunctive relief and damages on a number of theories. 7 7 Primarily, they challenged the drug testing policy on grounds that "warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests conducted for criminal investigatory purposes were unconstitutional searches" in violation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 78 The district court found that the petitioners had consented to the searches and upheld the drug testing policy and arrests. 179 [Vol. 37: 199 that the hospital's actions were constitutional because they were covered by the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of "whether the interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant."' 8 2
In a majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court overturned the Fourth Circuit's ruling and held that a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure.
8 3 The Court further held that the interests in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine cannot justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. 8 4 Finally, the Court bolstered patient's rights by noting that when state hospital employees obtain evidence from patients to give to law enforcement for criminal purposes, "they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional rights. . First, the state must demonstrate that it has some "special need" beyond normal law enforcement activities that make the search or seizure necessary. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Second, the state must show that its "special need" cannot be achieved or would be frustrated if a court forced it to abide by the usual probable cause and warrant requirements. See id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). If these two conditions are met by the state, the court then uses a balancing test to measure the state's interests against the person's privacy rights. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) . If the state's interests outweigh the person's privacy interests, the state's search or seizure will be affirmed as constitutional-even in the absence of probable cause or a warrant. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989 Illinois HMO Act, which provides for independent review of disputes between health plans, such as Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), and primary care physicians. 18 7 Consequently, HMOs cannot refuse to cover health care services deemed to be medically necessary by the independent reviewer under the Illinois law.' The case, involving services provided by a Virginia physician, should have far-reaching implications for other state laws regulating managed care organizations' denial of benefit practices. The Plaintiffs based this contention on the federal Medicaid requirement contained in the Boren Amendment, 9 4 which requires each state to assure the federal government that under its Medicaid program the state will reimburse nursing facilities at rates that are "reasonable and adequate."' 95 Although the Plaintiffs acknowledged that the Boren Amendment was repealed by Con- [Vol. 37: 199 gress effective October 1, 1997,196 they argued that a December 1997 policy letter from the United States Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") continued the "reasonable and adequate" standard from the Boren Amendment. 197 The Plaintiffs pointed out to the court that HCFA's policy letter stated:
"states are not required to subject their existing rates to a public process to the extent that those existing rates were validly determined in accordance with legal standards in effect prior to October 1, 1997." [Plaintiffs] urged that because DMAS had not adopted new rates pursuant to a public process since October 1, 1997, HCFA's letter effectively continued the "reasonable and adequate" standard of the Boren Amendment for DMAS' rates. Hospital filed a timely administrative appeal of Trigon's determination to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board ("the Board") of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). 206 Upon filing the appeal in July, 1997, the Board sent a letter to the hospital detailing a schedule for submission of "position papers.
The Board's letter explicitly stated that "preliminary position papers were due by November 1, 1998, and final papers by February 1, 1999. " 208 The Board sent a reminder letter to the Hospital in September 1997 that repeated the briefing schedule and warned that failure to meet the deadlines would result in dismissal of the appeal. 2°9 The Hospital did not file either a preliminary or a final position paper. 21° It claimed that these failures were the result of "internal confusion" at the Hospital caused by Inova Health System's acquisition of the Hospital, an event that had occurred "after the appeal was filed but before the position papers were due." 211 The Board dismissed the appeal because the Hospital failed to file the proper papers on time. 212 Following the dismissal of the appeal, the hospital challenged the Board's decision by suing the HHS in federal court. 213 The district court reviewed the Board's decision to dismiss the appeal and granted summary judgment to HHS. 214
Circuit also upheld a Virginia rule which provides for the reimbursement of nursing home interest expenses at the reconstruction financing bonds interest rate rather than the higher rates of a mortgage obtained by the nursing home to secure the bonds. [Vol. 37: 199 Following the district court's ruling, the Hospital appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that in dismissing the appeal, the Board:
(1) "violated the Due Process Clause"; (2) "violated the hospital's right to a hearing under the Medicare Act"; and (3) violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") because the "Boards' dismissal rule is invalid because it was not promulgated under the APA's notice and comment procedure."
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit was faced with two questions: "(1) whether the hospital is entitled to judicial review and (2) whether, if judicial review is available, the Board acted properly in dismissing the hospital's administrative appeal." 2 16 In regard to the first question, the court held that "there are judicially manageable standards for reviewing each of the Hospital's claims. As a result, there is no bar to judicial review because none of the Hospital's claims are 'committed to agency discretion by law.' 21 7 In regard to the second issue, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly determined that the Board can only dismiss an administrative appeal "if the provider cannot show excusable neglect for its failure to file a timely position paper. "218 Therefore, since the hospital failed to show "excusable neglect," no material facts were in dispute and the district court's award of summary judgment to HHS was proper. 21 [Vol. 37 :199 In Virmani, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with the decision of whether or not to recognize a privilege for physician peer review materials.
2 3 3 A physician ("Virmani") alleged that Presbyterian Hospital ("Presbyterian") discriminated against him when Presbyterian terminated Virmani's privileges. 2 3 4 During discovery, Virmani attempted to obtain "all peer review records related to all reviews of physicians for any reason, during the twenty years preceding his request." 2 35
Presbyterian moved for a protective order, arguing that peer review materials were privileged under the Federal Rules of Evidence and North Carolina law. 236 Refusing to recognize a privilege for medical peer review materials, the district court denied Presbyterian's motion for a protective order.
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On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Presbyterian argued "that the district court erred in refusing to recognize a privilege for documents related to medical peer review proceedings."
2 3 " The court
held "that the interest in obtaining probative evidence in an action for discrimination outweighs the interest that would be furthered by recognition of a privilege for medical peer review materials." 239 Therefore, in declining to recognize a privilege for medical peer review materials, the court affirmed the district court's order. In response to Green's request, the Department filed a motion in Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court. 2 47 The district court judge found "good cause to deny Green access to his daughter's medical, hospital, and other health records, except to the extent authorized by his daughter's treating physician." 24 8 Green appealed this decision to the circuit court. 24 9 In the circuit court, the judge found that Green's access to his daughter's medical records would interfere with her disclosures to her therapist, would be harmful to her, and was "not in her best interests." 2 5 " Therefore, the judge denied Green access to his daughter's hospital, medical, and other health records. 2 5 '
On appeal, the Virginia Court of Appeals noted that a parent can be denied access to his child's medical records for "good cause shown." 2 52 The court further noted that the "testimony of the therapist and the report of the psychiatrist are unrebutted by any evidence explaining how Green's daughter, who needs psychological treatment, would benefit or progress in resolving issues if Green had access to her medical records., 2 5 3 Therefore, the lower court's decision finding good cause in denying Green access to his daughter's medical records, was affirmed. [Vol. 37:199 fendant doctor accused of the unlawful distribution and dispensing of controlled substances." Although the district court judge denied the hospital's motion, the judge recognized a strong federal policy to protect the privacy of patient medical records. 257 The court required the government to provide written notice to each patient involved and to allow each patient the opportunity to object to the medical record disclosure. 258
F. Tort Claims and Professional Liability Insurance
Medical malpractice claims and awards in the United States have increased dramatically. 259 Between 1993 and 1999, the average medical malpractice award granted by juries grew eightyfour percent from $1.9 to $3.5 million.° The medical malpractice plaintiffs bar's overwhelming success has caused insurers that transact professional liability coverage in the medical field to scramble for survival. 26 . 2000) , which recognizes a patient's right of privacy in the content of his/her medical record and sets forth procedural requirements for submitting a subpoena for medical records, was inapplicable. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 611. Because this case was a federal criminal matter, state procedural law did not apply. However, the judge explained that the Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act privacy standards restrict a health care provider's disclosure of a patient's medical records and indicate a strong federal policy to protect the patient's privacy in the content of the patient's health information. Id. at 612.
258. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 612. The court held that the government [must]provide written notice prior to production of the subpoenaed records to the last known address of each individual whose records are sought under the subpoena. The notice must inform the individual that he or she may object to disclosure within five business days of the date the notice was mailed. If the government objects to giving notice, it must show cause before this court as to why notice would be unduly burdensome or prejudicial in a particular instance. Liability insurance rate increases have been especially difficult for our nation's long-term care industry. Insurance companies that underwrite nursing homes generally provide coverage to facilities nationwide and distribute costs evenly over nursing homes throughout the country. Consequently, the high costs for negligence claims against long-term care providers in one state causes liability insurance premiums to skyrocket for nursing homes in other states.
An ambiguous statute in Florida started an avalanche of resident's rights lawsuits in the late 1980s that continued through the 1990s. 266 Florida's recent surge of settlements and verdicts involving long-term care providers has taken its toll on Virginia nursing homes. For this reason, the Virginia Health Care Asso-ciation is searching for a creative solution to the crisis. Some Virginia long-term care providers have started to enter into binding arbitration agreements with their residents upon admission to their facilities.
2 6 7 The nursing homes hope that this will encourage insurers to lower their liability insurance premiums.
IV. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
A. Patient Safety
Beginning with the 1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) study, 268 there has been increased interest at both the national and state levels in patient safety and efforts to support patient safety and medical/health care error reduction. In January 2001, the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Health Organizations came out with its own manual revisions addressing sentinel events and how to address them in facilities through development of root cause analyses.
2 6 9 Other national organizations prepared their own error reduction reports designed to support the IOM study and push patient safety and error reduction efforts into the forefront.
The Commonwealth has established its own organization through the coordination and assistance of health care stakeholders such as the Virginia Hospital and Health Care Association and the Medical Society of Virginia. This organization, the Virginians Improving Patient Care and Safety (VIPC&S), has 267. Agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims are valid and enforceable in Virginia. However, a medical malpractice arbitration agreement is only valid if its terms allow the resident to withdraw from the arbitration agreement at any time within a period of at least sixty days after the termination of health care. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12 (Repl. Vol. 2000). met several times and is working towards collaboration of best practice guidelines drawing from both health care and non-health care sources. 
B. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
After two years of stricter interpretations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), 273 the Department of Health and Human Services signaled a change in interpretation that was more favorable to hospitals receiving patients in emergency medical conditions. 4 Proposed regulations modify the standards that apply to the definition of a "hospital" for EMTALA purposes . 5 The new regulations would define a hospital so as to limit the application of EMTALA regulations to outpatient centers. 276 One question raised by EMTALA legislation is the extent to which it affects the involuntary commitment process in Virginia.
2 " A June 2001 Attorney General's opinion confirms that the federal EMTALA legislation does not preempt or conflict with civil commitments.
2 " The Attorney General's opinion finds that while community services boards may designate the facility in which the person will be confined, the Board does not require a hospital to admit the person over its objection 2 1 in cases interpreting EMTALA requirements.
28°C
.
Fraud and Abuse Issues
Anti-fraud activities against health care providers are on the rise in Virginia and nationally. The number of fraud and abuse cases that have taken place in Virginia over the past year remains a secret, because the majority of fraud and abuse cases brought against health care organizations are settled quickly and quietly. Three fraud and abuse cases that affected Virginia providers in 2001 were HCMF Corporation, 281 Chippenham Associates, L.P.
HCMF Corporation pled guilty to improperly claiming reimbursement for salaries and benefits paid to thirty HCMF owners, family members, and employees who allegedly performed little or no work or whose duties were unrelated to operating the eighteen nursing facilities." 4 Based on the plea, HCMF admitted to having submitted false and misleading documentation to Medicare and Medicaid auditors in order to justify its claims. 2 85 As part of its plea agreement, HCMF agreed to pay restitution in the amount of $1.7 million, the chairman of HCMF's Board of Directors agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the restitution amount, and both the Chairman and Treasurer pled guilty to making false statements in connection with a federal health care program. 28 6 These pleas by officers will lead to exclusion and possible criminal penalties. 8 7 In a recent settlement for its culpable conduct in operating a nursing facility that had poor Medicare and Medicaid survey results, Chippenham Associates, L.P., and its manager agreed to pay $250,000 and spend another $250,000 in facility improvements to keep the facility operational despite Chippenham Associates, L.P.'s bankruptcy.
when the parties billed federal and state health care programs for medications in amounts exceeding what actually was given out to the patients. 2 9° CVS and Revco allegedly dispensed partial prescriptions to patients and billed the government programs for full prescriptions. 2 9 ' CVS agreed to settle the allegations by paying $4 million to the federal government, the District of Columbia, and several participating states, including Virginia. 2 9 2 In addition, CVS was required to enter into an integrity agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General ("OIG"). 29 3
To avoid potential criminal actions or civil liabilities in fraud and abuse allegations, health care providers should, at the very least, be aware of the most recent advisory opinions issued by the OIG. Over the past year and a half, the OIG issued twenty-eight advisory opinions. 2 94 Additional resources are also available on the Office of Inspector General Web site, 2 95 including links to OIG compliance program advice for various health care providers, lists of persons no longer able to provide services to federal health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, and specific reports and information for health care providers and their counsel concerning regulatory activities of the OIG and changes in enforcement policies and practice. There is a joke that follows a late night television sequence on the top ten reasons to be a health care lawyer. One of the top ten reasons is "likes to fall asleep reading the Federal Register." In Virginia over the last two years, the same could be said about 299. MDS stands for "Minimum Data Set," a collection of information on each resident's activities of daily living skills at various points during a nursing facility stay.
300. 30 in more detail, those matters will have to be left to future survey articles. However as this survey demonstrates, there have been significant developments in health care law generated by the Virginia General Assembly, the courts, and administrative agencies. Most of these changes alter at least one of the health policy principles of cost, quality, access, and equity. In addition, the article demonstrates the increasing role that federal reimbursement legislation is playing in health care law. 307. The Family Access to Medical Insurance Security Plan ("FAMIS"), formerly known as Virginia Children's Medical Security Insurance Plan ("VCMSIP"), provides health care coverage assistance for children through the age of eighteen who currently do not have health insurance and who meet the financial criteria set by the state. The program is financed by state and federal governmental funds, and is designed to cover children of working Virginia families that do not qualify for medical assistance under Medicaid and cannot afford private insurance. In recent years, the Commonwealth has made significant efforts to increase enrollment numbers for this program. 
